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This article examines the relationship between the level of regulation and transparency 
of financial institutions from 37 countries and the impacts of the subprime crisis on the 
stock  market,  through  a  regulation  and  transparency  index.  Furthermore,  with  the 
objective of detecting reasons for the success of some emerging economies in avoiding 
the  crisis,  empirical  evidence  for  the  presence  of  market  discipline  in  the  Brazilian 
banking  industry  is  shown.  The  results  are  that  a  higher  degree  of  regulation  and 
transparency is related to higher returns and lower volatility in the stock market during 
the subprime crisis. Moreover, one of the main reasons for the apparent success of the 
Brazilian  case  in  facing  the  crisis  is  the  combination  of  a  strong  regulation  of  the 
financial system and the presence of market discipline. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The  financial  turmoil  at  the  end  of  the  2000  decade  has  stimulated  several 
discussions concerning the model of financial regulation practiced in the world. The 
current model, based on New Basel Capital Accord (New Accord), fails as a mechanism 
for mitigating financial  crises.  One important  point that is being considered  on this 
subject is that an efficient regulation system, through specific and adequate legislation 
of central banks, eliminates problems caused by market imperfections.
1  
Government supervisions emphasize the existence of the systemic risk in the 
financial framework. A failure in a single institution can launch instability in the whole 
system provoking a confidence crisis in the market. As a consequence, the systemic risk 
associated with the presence of asymmetric information can justify regulation of the 
financial institutions by the government. 
As highlighted by Flannery (1998), government agents have the advantage of 
lower costs and more access to the information. One justification is that there are no 
problems  of  coordination  (government  is  the  single  regulator)  and  there  exist 
instruments  that  force  the  institutions  to  disclose  information.  However,  these 
advantages  can  be  suppressed  by  the  government  with  a  policy  of  transparency  of 
information, such as highlighted in the third pillar of the New Accord. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  lack  of  transparency  of  information  in  the 
financial market represented a non-negligible element for spreading the subprime crisis 
in 2008. Moreover, the necessity for information emerges as a relevant factor for the 
market  discipline.  According  to  the  literature,  an  effective  transparency  in  the 
information  disclosed  to  the  private  agents  is  a  tool  for  monitoring  financial 
institutions.
2 Another advantage due to the transparency of information to the market is 
that it allows the private agents to analyze the key information on capital, risk exposure, 
and  the evaluation  process.  As pointed out  by  Goodhart, Hoffmann,  and Segoviano 
(2004) the equalization  of the accounting data  permits  comparing  the results  of the 
financial  institutions  and  thus  facilitates  the  definition  of  criteria  for  the  market’s 
participants taking decisions. 
In a general way, although several reports indicate the relevance of the market 
discipline, regulators are reluctant regarding this subject. This aversion is a consequence 
                                                 
1 About types of market imperfections which justify regulatory intervention, see Goodhart et al. (1998). 
2 See, Flannery (1998); Deyoung et al. (2001); Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux (2002). 5 
of the regulators not believing in the market forces as true monitors. In opposition to 
this view, some authors such as Flannery and Sorescu (1996) argue that investors in the 
subordinated debt market can offer an adequate supervision to the banks. In fact, the 
substitution  of  supervision  agencies  by  market  discipline  or  vice  versa  is  not 
recommended. The complementarity between them can be the key for mitigating the 
origin of financial crisis. In other words, to assure that market discipline is better than 
government supervision, or vice versa, is a mistake.  
Among several countries, Brazil has been considered as an example where the 
effects caused by subprime crisis on the financial market were not destructive. It is 
important  to  note  that  Brazil,  due  to  the  experience  of  the  financial  crisis  which 
occurred  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  with  the  failure  of  big  banks,  assumed  a 
conservativeness  position  concerning  prudential  financial  regulation  greater  than  the 
other countries. In addition, the macroeconomic stabilization achieved, especially from 
2003, has contributed to the development of the financial system.
3 An example is the 
significant increase in the negotiation of debentures (see www.debentures.com.br). This 
observation  matters  because  the  literature  regarding  market  discipline  highlights  the 
subordinated debt holders as being able to monitor the financial industry. In short, it is 
possible  that  the  good  performance  of  the  Brazilian  economy  in  respect  to  the 
international crisis is a result of the combination of an adequate government regulation 
with the presence of market discipline. 
This article contributes to the literature on financial regulation and transparency 
of information taking into account the subprime crisis. This article offers a regulation 
and transparency index (RTI) based on 37 countries. Considering RTI and stock market 
index  of  developed  economies,  BRICs  economies,  and  developing  economies,  an 
empirical  analysis  is  performed.  The  objective  is  to  see  if  there  exists  a  difference 
between the impact of the subprime crisis on countries with more transparency and a 
more regulated financial system than on others. Moreover, with the intention of finding 
the reasons for the success of the Brazilian case in escaping the financial crisis, an 
empirical  analysis  for  detecting  the  presence  of  market  discipline  in  the  banking 
industry is made. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section shows how 
the RTI of the financial institutions is built and an analysis for the performance of 
                                                 
3 For an analysis concerning macroeconomic variables and financial market developments concerning 
emerging markets, see Bokpin (2010). 6 
developed economies, BRICs economies, and developing economies is made. Section 3 
makes  an  empirical  analysis,  through  cross-country  estimations,  regarding  RTI  and 
stock  market  performance.  Section  4  presents  the  main  characteristics  of  market 
discipline  in  the  literature  and  the  data  used  in  the  analysis  for  the  Brazilian  case. 
Section 5 makes an empirical analysis, through GMM panel data, concerning market 
discipline in Brazil based on subordinated debt holders. 
 
2. Transparency and financial regulation 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) through an analysis of the relationship between 
banking and monetary crises which occurred in Mexico (1970s) and in Asia (1980s) 
present  elucidative  results.  The  authors  observed  that  there  exists  a  non-correlation 
between the financial crisis and payment balance crisis in the 1970s (period marked by a 
financial system with strong prudential regulation). On the other hand, the correlation is 
found in the 1980s due to the financial markets openness. In addition, according to this 
view, flexibility in the prudential regulation rules is a fact before financial crises.  
As  recognized  by  the  U.S.  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Timothy  Geithner,  the 
international crisis observed since the second semester of 2008 had as one of its main 
reasons the lack of an adequate regulation.
4  In particular, the public made incorrect 
decisions due to the presence of asymmetric information. Hence, the objective of this 
section is to make an analysis regarding banking regulation, through transparency, for 
several big financial institutions with their home offices in several countries. 
Taking into account the information made available by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, this analysis is made based on three groups of countries:  
(i)  Developed  economies  –  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  France, 
Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Japan,  Norway,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Portugal, 
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and 
USA;  
(ii) BRICs economies - Brazil, Russia, India, and China; and 
(iii) Emerging economies – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
India,  Indonesia,  Mexico,  Philippines,  Russia,  Slovak  Republic,  South  Africa,  Sri 
Lanka, and Turkey. 
                                                 
4 See, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/21/opinion/21sun1.html?scp=2&sq=&st=nyt. 7 
Studies concerning regulation and transparency of central banks are frequent in 
the  literature.  In  a  general  way,  the  existence  of  asymmetric  information  between 
monetary authority and the other economic agents justifies the necessity of transparency 
in the management of the monetary policy.
5 A high degree of transparency attenuates 
uncertainties,  improves  the  capacity  of  the  private  sector  to  understand  the  central 
bank’s decisions and amplifies the monetary policy efficiency.
6 Using this interpretation 
for  the  financial  institutions,  the  transparency  can  be  defined  as  the  presence  of 
asymmetric information  between the financial firms  and the other economic agents. 
Therefore  an  improvement  in  the  transparency  of  the  banking  system  reduces  the 
uncertainty of the financial market, improves the public’s perception and can, through 
market discipline, lead to a better banking supervision. 
Such as the types of transparency in the management of the monetary policy,
7 
we  make  a  classification  of  the  financial  institutional  transparency  in  the  following 
manner: 
(i) Political transparency – can be understood as institutional transparency – refers to the 
access  by  the  public  in  regard  to  the  institutional  objectives  and  organizational 
arrangements that classify the conduct of the financial policymakers; and 
(ii) Economic transparency – focuses the financial information (data, risk models, and 
financial forecasts) which is used in the conduction of the financial policy adopted by 
the banking industry. 
  Due to the relevance of the transparency and regulation for the stability of the 
sector and taking into account the proposal in the New Accord, an index for evaluating 
the behavior of several  banking institutions  concerning  the principles of Basel  II  is 
made.  In  order  to  create  a  “regulation  and  transparency  index”,  the  economic 
transparency was divided into two subgroups. The first is centered on the risks of the 
financial firms while the second is focused on the accounting information (the period of 
analysis includes the months of September, October, and November 2008).  
Table  1  presents  the  method  for  calculating  the  degree  of  transparency  and 
regulation  of  the  financial  institutions.  The  answers  to  the  queries  were  classified 
obeying the following criteria: (i) degree “1” is ascribed to the institutions when the 
activity under consideration (from 1.1.1 to 2.4) is an exigency defined by the regulatory 
                                                 
5 Regarding this point, see de Mendonça and Simão Filho (2007). 
6 See, Siklos (2000), Clare and Courtenay (2001), and Bernanke (2004). 
7 See, Geraats (2002). 8 
agencies; (ii) degree “0.5” is ascribed to the institutions when, although the activity is 
not an exigency of regulatory agencies, the banking institution carries it out in a regular 
way;  and (iii) degree “0”  is  ascribed  to  the institutions  when neither the institution 
performs the activity nor is it an exigency of the regulatory agencies. 
 
Table 1 
Regulation and transparency index (RTI) 
Code  Queries  Degree 
1  Economic Transparency   
1.1  Concerning institutional risks and principles of Basel II   
  1.1.1  Institution calculates the credit risk  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
  1.1.2  Credit risk is disclosed in periodic reports  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
  1.1.3  Institution calculates the market risk   0, 0.5 or 1.0 
  1.1.4  Market risk is disclosed in periodic reports  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
  1.1.5  Institution calculates the operational risk  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
  1.1.6  Operational risk is disclosed in periodic reports  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
1.2  Concerning accounting information and policy of transparency    
  1.2.1  Reports are available quarterly  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
  1.2.2  Reports are available yearly  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
  1.2.3  Basel index is calculated and disclosed in the reports  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
2  Political Transparency   
2.1  Capital structure of the institution is disclosed in the account reports  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
2.2  Structure and risk management policies are disclosed  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
2.3  Policies for mitigating risk (hedge) are disclosed  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
2.4  Market environments and forecasts are disclosed  0, 0.5 or 1.0 
    Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
 
The focus on the developed economies shows the different levels of commitment 
with the introduction of the principles of Basel II (see table 2). Collecting information 
available in the sites of the main banks used in this study for the period from September 
25, 2008 to November 30, 2008, a significant variation in the indices for the countries in 
the sample is detected. The countries with the worst performance are South Korea and 
Greece with a regulation and transparency index of 5.5 and 6.5, respectively. On the 
other hand, the highest indices (degree 11) are observed for the USA, New Zealand, and 
Sweden. 
The main reason for the classification of South Korea and Greece is due to the 
lack  of  publication  concerning  market  and  operational  risks  by  the  banks  and  also 
because this publication is not compulsory (1.1.4 and 1.1.6). Another relevant point is 
that the banks in these countries do not disclose their policies for mitigating risk nor 9 
market environments and forecasts (2.3 and 2.4). Contrary to these cases, USA and New 
Zealand  have  a  classification  greater  than  zero  for  almost  all  items  (except  for  the 




RTI – developed and emerging economies 
I/P  1.1.1  1.1.2  1.1.3  1.1.4  1.1.5  1.1.6  1.2.1  1.2.2  1.2.3  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4  Total 
Australia  1  1  1  0.5  1  0.5  0  1  1  0  1  1  0.5  9.5 
Austria  1  1  1  1  1  0.5  0.5  1  0  1  0.5  0  0.5  9.0 
Belgium  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  1  1  0.5  0.5  0.5  0  8.5 
Canada  1  1  0.5  0.5  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  0.5  0  7.5 
Denmark  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  0  8.5 
France  1  1  1  0  1  0  0.5  1  1  0  0  0.5  0.5  7.5 
Germany  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.5  1  1  0  0.5  0.5  0.5  10.0 
Greece  1  0.5  1  0  1  0  0.5  1  1  0  0.5  0  0  6.5 
Italy  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  1  1  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  9.0 
Japan  1  0.5  1  0  1  0  0.5  1  1  0  0.5  0.5  0.5  7.5 
Netherlands  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  0.5  0  0.5  8.0 
New Zealand  1  1  1  1  1  0.5  1  1  1  0  1  1  0.5  11.0 
Norway  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  1  0  1  0.5  0  0  7.5 
Portugal  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  0  1  0.5  0.5  9.0 
Singapore  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0.5  0.5  0.5  7.5 
South Korea  1  1  0.5  0.5  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0.5  5.5 
Spain  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  1  1  1  0.5  0.5  0.5  9.5 
Sweden  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.5  1  1  1  0.5  0.5  0.5  11.0 
Switzerland  1  1  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  1  1  0  0.5  0.5  0.5  9.0 
Taiwan  1  1  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  1  1  0  0.5  0.5  0.5  9.0 
United Kingdom  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0  0  1  1  0.5  0.5  0.5  8.0 
USA  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  0.5  0.5  11.0 
Argentina  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  3.0 
Brazil  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  1  1  1  0.5  0.5  0.5  9.5 
Chile  1  1  1  0.5  0  0  1  1  1  0.5  0  0  0  7.0 
China  1  1  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  1  1  0  0.5  0.5  0.5  9.5 
Czech Republic  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  0  8.0 
Hungary  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  6.0 
India  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5  1  1  0  0.5  0.5  0.5  8.5 
Indonesia  1  1  1  1  0  0  0.5  1  0  1  0.5  0  0.5  7.5 
Mexico  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  6.0 
Philippines  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  0.5  1  0.5  0  0.5  8.5 
Russia  1  0.5  1  0.5  0  0  0.5  1  1  0  0.5  0.5  0  6.5 
Slovak Republic  1  1  1  0.5  1  0  1  1  0  1  0.5  0  0  8.0 
South Africa  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0  1  1  1  0.5  0.5  0  8.5 
Sri Lanka  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  1  0.5  1  0.5  0  0.5  7.0 
Turkey  1  0.5  1  0.5  1  0  0.5  1  1  0  0.5  0.5  0  7.5 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
The principles of Basel II have been in practice since 2008 and have a timeline 
for adaptation of three more years. Notwithstanding, North American institutions, as the 
Citigroup,  adopted  a  behavior  that  implied  the  highest  index  of  regulation  and 
transparency (degree 11). 
Based on the information gathered from sites of the main banking institutions of 10 
the developed countries, it is observed that there exists a lack of clarity and transparency 
regarding  market  and  operational  risks  as  well  as  the  Basel  index.  Therefore,  the 
regulatory  agencies  may  define  what  information  must  be  made  available  by 
internationally active banks and that it must be standardized in a manner which allows a 
better comparison among them. Indeed, if the institutional transparency is amplified it is 
possible for the public to have accurate expectations and thus the market tends to work 
with greater stability. 
  The BRICs countries deserve attention because, according to Goldman Sachs 
(2001), these economies can become the most important economies in the world by 
2050. The classification in  table  2  indicates  that Brazil and China have the highest 
regulation and transparency index (9.5) among the BRICs. The highlight for Brazil is 
that only this country in this group discloses information about forecasts and market 
environments (2.4). Moreover, Brazil received a classification greater than zero for all 
items. Regarding China, it is important to note that the entry of foreign institutions was 
only permitted after the conclusion of the restructuring of the domestic banking system, 
especially concerning the four biggest public banks: Bank of China, Agricultural Bank 
of  China,  China  Construction  Bank,  and  Industry  and  Commerce  Bank  of  China 
(ICBC). Furthermore, until April 2008, only two Chinese banks (the Bank of China and 
the Bank of Communications) were present in the USA. Notwithstanding, at least six 
other Chinese banks, such as the ICBC, are planning to ask the Fed’s authorization to 
open  for  business  in  American  territory  and  thus  will  be  adjusted  based  on  the 
regulation criteria determined by this country. 
Such as for the case of developed countries, a significant divergence among the 
regulation and transparency indices is observed (minimum of 6.5 and maximum of 9.5). 
In  a  general  way,  it  is  observed  that  the  central  banks  in  the  BRICs  constrain  the 
calculation  of  regulatory  capital  for  covering  risk  (credit,  market,  and  operational). 
However, there exists only the requirement for disclosure of the credit risk although the 
disclosure of the others is encouraged. In this group, only the Central Bank of Brazil 
discloses a quarterly Basel index. The negative highlight is the Russian case with a 
regulation and transparency index of only 6.5. This result is explained by the fact that 
the Russian banks did not disclose their operational risk (1.1.5 and 1.1.6), forecasts and 
market environments (2.4). 
Besides the BRICs countries the following developing countries were considered 
in  the  sample:  Argentina,  Chile,  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Indonesia,  Mexico, 11 
Philippines,  Slovak  Republic,  South  Africa,  Sri  Lanka,  and  Turkey.  The  findings 
indicate that the BRICs economies had better results in comparison with other emerging 
economies. Besides the BRICs countries, South Africa presented a good performance 
(degree of 8.5 – see table 2). This result is explained by the performance of the Standard 
Bank (biggest South African bank) which presents publication of its risk exposition 
(credit, market, and operational). 
The worst performance, considering all countries, is the Argentinean case with a 
degree of 3. The reason for this result is that in this country the regulatory agency only 
requires the disclosure of the balance sheet of the banking firms. Further, Argentina was 
the only country that did not present a capital structure of its financial institutions (2.1). 
The  other  countries  with  a  performance  lower  than  the  average  were  Hungary  and 
Mexico (6.0). The Mexican banks neither calculate nor disclose data concerning market 
risk  (1.1.3  and  1.1.4)  and  the  Hungarian  banks  neither  calculate  nor  disclose  data 
concerning operational  risk (1.1.5 and  1.1.6).  Moreover, there  are no  disclosures  in 
these  countries  in  regard  to  their  risk  management  policies,  forecasts  and  market 
environments (2.2, 2.3, and 2.4). In the other countries the results are medians and thus 
suggest  the  necessity  of  an  increase  in  the  rigor  for  the  regulatory  agencies  in  the 
supervision of the financial institutions. 
 
3. Regulation and transparency index and stock market performance 
 
With the objective of making a connection of the regulation and transparency 
index (RTI) with the subprime crisis, an analysis which considers the RTI with the most 
known stock market index of each one of the 37 countries is made. The justification for 
the use of the stock market indices is because they respond quickly to a financial crisis. 
Moreover, as recognized by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the weakening in equity 
prices most likely, reflects both the deteriorating cyclical position of the economy and 
the worsening balance sheets of firms. 
  The period under analysis comprises the months of September and October 2008 
(daily  data).  The  justification  for  the  use  of  these  months  is  that  they  represent  an 
intensification of the subprime crisis after the failure of Lehman Brothers.
8 As can be 
seen by figure 1, September and October 2008 are the months with the deepest fall in 
the stock markets and thus represent the peak of the subprime crisis. Furthermore, after 
                                                 
8 See BBC news, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7096845.stm. 12 
this period several measures were adopted by the main central banks in the world as an 
attempt to mitigate the crisis. 
 
Figure 1 
Yield of the Stock Market Index (SR) – Monthly
9 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Firstly, the yield of the stock market index (SR) is obtained through the division 









For an analysis regarding the volatility in the stock markets, the coefficient of 
variation of the stock market indices (CV) was used as a proxy. In other words, the ratio 
between the standard deviation (SDIP) and the mean (IP ) of the index, 





Focusing the analysis for the relation between RTI and SR, and between RTI and 
CV, it is observed in both cases that there exists a non-negligible correlation between 
the variables (0.37 and -0.40 respectively – see figure 2). This observation suggests that 
countries with a higher accountability in banking regulation (high values of RTI) have 
                                                 
9 Figure 1 considers the path of the 37 countries under analysis (see table 2). 13 
attenuated the effects caused by the crisis. In fact, these markets registered less financial 
losses and less volatility in comparison with countries where the RTI was lower. Table 3 
shows, besides the RTI, SR, and CV, the descriptive statistics for those variables. 
 
Figure 2 
RTI and Stock Market Performance
10 
RTI and SR 
 
RTI and CV 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Based on the aforementioned arguments, it is possible to assume that a greater 
accountability of the financial institutions in response to the greater rigor in the rules, 
imposed by regulatory and supervision agencies, together with the transparency rules 
proposed by the New Accord promoted less vulnerability in this period of crisis. 
As a robustness check for the result above, cross-country estimations (OLS) for 
analyzing the effects from regulation and transparency (RTI) on return of stock market 
(SR) and volatility in the stock markets (CV) were made (see table 4). Due to the fact 
that in the period under analysis all returns of stock market indices were negative, the 
modulus of the variable SR is considered (greater values of |SR| mean greater losses). 
Furthermore, the following variables  were used as  control  variables in  the analysis: 
regulatory  quality  (RQ)  –  available  from  World  Bank  (www.govindicators.org);  a 
dummy  variable  (DIT)  which  takes  value  one  for  countries  which  adopts  inflation 
targeting and zero otherwise; Based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), a dummy variable 
(DEXA)  which  takes  value  equal  one  when  the  country  has  some  control  over  the 
exchange rate (e.g., currency board, crawling peg, de facto peg, etc.) and zero otherwise 
                                                 
10 Both graphs in figure 2 consider data from the 37 countries under analysis (see table 2). 14 




RTI, SR, and CV 
Country  Index  RTI   SR  CV 
Argentina  Merval  3.0  -0.43  0.21 
Australia  All Ordinaries  9.5  -0.23  0.10 
Austria  ATX  9.0  -0.44  0.23 
Belgium  Bel – 20  8.5  -0.33  0.17 
Brazil  Ibovespa  9.5  -0.32  0.17 
Canada  S&P TSX Composite  7.5  -0.27  0.13 
Chile  IPSA  7.0  -0.13  0.08 
China  Shanghai Composite  9.5  -0.26  0.09 
Czech Republic  PX  8.0  -0.40  0.19 
Denmark  KFX 20  8.5  -0.33  0.16 
France  CAC 40  7.5  -0.22  0.11 
Germany  DAX  10.0  -0.22  0.12 
Greece  General Share  6.5  -0.44  0.21 
Hungary  BUX  6.0  -0.35  0.17 
India  BSE 30  8.5  -0.32  0.16 
Indonesia  Composite  7.5  -0.40  0.13 
Italy  Milan MIBTel  9.0  -0.26  0.13 
Japan  Nikkei 225  7.5  -0.33  0.17 
Mexico  IPC  6.0  -0.23  0.13 
Netherlands  AMEX  8.0  -0.28  0.15 
New Zealand  NZSE 50  11.0  -0.16  0.07 
Norway  Total Share  7.5  -0.39  0.18 
Philippines  PSE  8.5  -0.27  0.13 
Portugal  PSI 20  9.0  -0.26  0.12 
Russia  Moscow Times  6.5  -0.49  0.30 
Singapore  Straits Times  7.5  -0.39  0.17 
Slovak Republic  SAX  8.0  -0.17  0.06 
South Africa  JSE  8.5  -0.22  0.11 
South Korea  Composite  5.5  -0.21  0.13 
Spain  Madri General  9.5  -0.32  0.12 
Sri Lanka  All Share  7.0  -0.24  0.10 
Sweden  Stockholm General  11.0  -0.28  0.13 
Switzerland  Swiss Market  9.0  -0.15  0.09 
Taiwan  Weighted  8.0  -0.39  0.18 
Turkey  IMKB 100  7.5  -0.29  0.20 
United Kingdom  FTSE 100  9.0  -0.22  0.12 
USA  Dow Jones  11.0  -0.19  0.11 
Mean    8.12  0.28  0.14 
Median    8.00  0.27  0.13 
Maximum    11.00  0.49  0.30 
Minimum    3.00  0.13  0.06 
Std. Dev.    1.61  0.08  0.05 
    Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Hence, the equations to be estimated are: 
                                                 
11  Other  variables  concerning  political  stability,  government  effectiveness,  rule  of  Law,  control  of 
corruption, commercial openness, were used in the estimations, but due to the parsimonious principle, this 
information was not considered in the final specifications of the models. 15 
(3)  0 1 2 3 4 SR RTI RQ DIT DEXA ,
12     and 




Cross-country estimations (OLS) 
   Dependent variable – SR  Dependent variable - CV 
  Coef.  Std. Error  Prob.  Coef.  Std. Error  Prob. 
Constant  0.4630  0.0488  0.0000  0.2289  0.0343  0.0000 
RTI  -0.0149  0.0058  0.0152  -0.0093  0.0044  0.0444 
RQ  -0.0294  0.0129  0.0300  0.0020  0.0096  0.8377 
DIT  -0.0360  0.0170  0.0420  -0.0204  0.0128  0.1209 
DEXA  -0.0259  0.0209  0.2233  -0.0101  0.0129  0.4400 
Dummy           0.1281  0.0419  0.0046 
F-statistic    4.1134  0.0084     5.1096  0.0016 
Jarque-Bera    0.4017  0.8180     0.1215  0.9411 
Ram.Reset (1)    0.0007  0.9793     0.0186  0.8923 
Ram.Reset (2)    0.0050  0.9950     0.0274  0.9730 
Arch LM (1)    0.0216  0.8841     1.0104  0.3219 
Arch LM (2)    0.0535  0.9480     0.5789  0.5663 
Arch LM (3)    0.1018  0.9583    0.4338  0.7304 
Arch LM (4)    0.6183  0.6532     1.9103  0.1365 
LM (1)    0.6400  0.4298     0.0078  0.9300 
LM(2)    1.0029  0.3788     0.3060  0.7387 
Adjusted R
2     0.2570  N=37     0.3634  N=37 
 
 
The evidence indicates the existence of a significant negative relation between 
SR and RTI which in turn confirms the interpretation above. In other words, countries 
with a greater level of accountability concerning transparency and banking regulation 
presented a lower loss in their stock markets than countries with less accountability. In 
regard to the second estimation, which considers the relation between CV and RTI, the 
evidence denotes a negative relation between the volatility in the stock markets and the 
regulation and transparency index. The statistical significance of the coefficient for RTI 
reveals that countries with a greater accountability concerning transparency and banking 
regulation had less volatility in their financial markets. 
 
                                                 
12 Box plot for the variable SR does not show presence of outliers (see appendix, figure A.1). 
13 A dummy variable is introduced in the model for eliminating the distortion caused by presence of one 
outlier (see box plot in appendix – figure A.1). 16 
4. Market discipline and the Brazilian financial system 
 
Market discipline is a regulation mechanism that delegates monitoring power not 
only to regulation agencies but also to market players which may have their wealth 
affected by the conduct of the financial institution (Ceuster and Masschelein, 2003). 
According to Flannery and Sorescu (1996) market discipline is the process where the 
market uses the information from the system to minimize losses in negotiation.  
In a general way, market discipline considers two different aspects (Bliss and 
Flannery,  2000):  skill  of  investors  in  the  evaluation  of  the  financial  health  of  the 
institutions and the competence of bank directors in response to the market position. 
Furthermore, for the effectiveness of the market discipline four conditions are needed 
(Lane,  1993):  (i)  free  and  open  financial  markets;  (ii)  publicity  regarding  debt 
management  and  solvency  by  financial  institutions;  (iii)  market  agents  believe  that 
managers never will be acquitted in the case of financial failure; and (iv) necessity of 
institutional managers response to market’s signals before they are excluded.  
The empirical literature concerning market discipline has as its main objective 
the study of the perception of private agents in relation to the financial wealth of banks 
in the moment of pricing their assets. The majority of the empirical studies was made 
for the U.S.A. and assumes subordinated debt holders as regulation agents. These works 
were  based  on  the  attempt  of  observing  a  positive  relation  between  credit  risk  and 
subordinated debts spreads. In regard to the identification of the risk, most of the studies 
used  ratings  from  private  agencies  (as  Moody’s  and  Standard  &  Poor’s)  or  central 
banks.  Among several  articles  in  the literature,  those of  Bliss  and Flannery (2000); 
Morgan and Stiroh (2001); and Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005), whose main 
objective is the analysis of the influence of private agents on management of financial 
institutions,  deserve  to  be  highlighted.  Bliss  and  Flannery  (2000)  and  Krishnan, 
Ritchken, and Thomson (2005) do not find strong evidence for the influence of the 
agents. On the other hand, Morgan and Stiroh (2001) prove the existence of market 
discipline.  
Flannery  and  Sorescu  (1996)  used  debentures  spreads  and  data  from 
Consolidated  Financial  Statements  reports  and  Call  Report  for  83  different  bank 
institutions (1983 to 1991). The empirical evidence, based on regressions with fixed 
regression panel and cross-section, indicated a strong correlation between subordinated 
debts spreads and credit ratings. Deyoung et al. (2001) based on CAMEL ratings and 17 
data extracted from FR Y-9 and Call Report from 1986 (second quarter) to 1995 (first 
quarter) built a sample with 1079 banks from different countries and 67 holding banks. 
One result was the identification of a positive correlation between the exposure to the 
risk and the subordinated debts spreads. 
According to the literature concerning market discipline, the key for proving its 
existence  is  through  the  confirmation  of  the  relation  between  the  profitability  of 
subordinated debts funds and the risk of financial institutions. Hence, based on Morgan 
and Stiroh (2001), an ex post analysis of variables and two types of data are necessary 
for  analyzing  market  discipline:  the  spread  premium  paid  by  debentures  and  the 
financial health of banks.  
For the Brazilian case, empirical evidence which proves the market discipline 
through  subordinated  debt  holders  is  still  reduced.  Notwithstanding,  there  exists 
information that permits an evaluation. The Debentures National System (DNS) releases 
a  daily  report of  the unitary price (UP) of the subordinated debts  negotiated in  the 
secondary market. For this study, debentures regarding banks from the second quarter of 
2001 to the second quarter of 2009 were considered. The sample takes into account 40 
debentures of 11 different banks totaling 570 observations for panel data (unbalanced).
14 
With the objective of calculating the spread premium (SP) paid by debentures in the 
quarter t, the UP of the assets on the last day of the quarter was divided by the UP of the 
same assets for the last day of the previous quarter and the results are deducted from the 











It  is  assumed  that  the  spread  of  debentures  has  a  positive  relation  with  the 
banking risk, that is, an increase in risk for institutions implies an increase in the return 
for private agents (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). Here, two different perspectives are 
considered for the analysis of risk incurred by firms. The first is concerning the ratings 
of debentures (R). Under this view, the analysis considers 11 levels of risk based on 
ratings disclosed by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, Atlantic, Austin, SR, and Fitch 
                                                 
14 The banks are: ABM Arom Bank, Banco Francês e Brasileiro, Itaú, Banco BMG, BIC, Bradesco, 
Dibens, HSBC, Panamericano, Safra, and Santander. 
15 In the Brazilian case, the interest rate free of risk corresponds to the over/Selic rate (Brazilian Treasury 
bond). 18 
Atlantic.
16 The debenture ratings were extracted from DNS (www.debentures.com.br). 
The  second  view  takes  into  consideration  indicators  calculated  through  data  from 
financial institutions’ accountability reports.  
This study is based on quarterly data from Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Brazil (CVM) and Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) for the banking conglomerate. It is 
important to note that the main objective of this section is to analyze the behavior of the 
whole financial institution in relation to the risk incurred by firms considering the power 
of influence of the private agents. As a consequence, four indices which represent the 
health of banks were selected:  
(i) Level of default (LD) – considers all credits default with a period greater than 15 
days. Moreover, for patterning the index, taking into account the size of banking firms, 
the  amount  of  credit  default  (ACD)  was  divided  by  the  total  assets  (AT)  less 






Hence, an increase in the level of default of banking institutions increases the exposition 
to the credit risk and thus a higher spread premium is demanded by investors. 
(ii) Immobilization index (II) – denotes the level of immobilization of capital of the 








Therefore, a higher index indicates a low liquidity, which in turn suggests a higher 
exposition to the risk and thus a higher return is demanded by private agents.  
(iii) Net profit index (NPI) – high profits are associated with higher risks assumed by 
financial institutions (Estrella, 2004) and thus a higher spread is demanded in this case. 
Moreover, with the intention of patterning the index taking into consideration the size of 







(iv)  Basel  index  (BI)  –  capital  over  assets  measured  by  risks.  A  higher  indicator 
                                                 
16 Due to the scarcity of data provided by a single agency, the use of all information provided by several 
agencies regarding risk was considered in this analysis. 
17 See resolution National Monetary Council 3,490, August 29, 2007.  19 
indicates a higher solvency of the bank, which in turn reveals a lower credit risk and 








  The Brazilian current capital obligation is 11% of exposures net of provision 
(Basel Committee defines 8%) and it obeys Circular N. 3.360/2007 which prescripts 
minimum  provisioning  percentages  according  to  a  classification  criteria.  Capital  is 
defined  as  the  sum  of:  equity,  net  income,  reserves,  preferred  stocks,  subordinated 
debts, and hybrid instruments. Regulatory capital is the sum of risk weighted assets and 
other  capital  requirements  (capital  for  credit  risk  of  swaps,  capital  for  interest  rate 
market risk, and capital for foreign exchange rate market risk). 
  Table 5 surveys the descriptive statistics of the variables for the panel data. 
 
Table 5  
Descriptive statistics 
Variables    Mean   Median   Maximum   Minimum  Standard 
deviation 
Observ. 
SP  -0.0197  -0.0001  0.3605  -0.6566  0.0661  570 
R  9.0000  8.0000  11.0000  3.0000  1.7649     510
18 
BI  15.9680  15.7400  25.8500  11.7500  2.5876  570 
LD  0.0235  0.0079  1.0278  0.0000  0.1111  570 
II  36.7394  41.9100  74.8900  0.9200  16.4697  570 
NPI  1.0085  1.0077  1.0409  0.9938  0.0055  570 
 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
 
  With the objective of testing the market discipline through subordinated debt 
holders for the Brazilian case, the panel data method proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) is employed. This method corresponds to the estimation of a first difference 
General Method of Moments (GMM) panel data as a manner of eliminating the non-
observed effects in the regressions. In particular, this method is adequate for this study 
because it avoids the possibility of simultaneity problem being a consequence of the 
financial  wealth  of  banking  firms  may  be  influenced  by  debentures  spreads.  An 
advantage of GMM in comparison with the traditional regressions in cross-section and 
                                                 
18 The number of observations is lower than the other variables because HSBC and Santander do not have 
ratings. 20 
panel  is  that  GMM  estimators  are  not  inconsistent  with  omitted  variables  (Bond, 
Hoeffler, and Temple, 2001). In addition, the use of instrument variables allows the 
estimation of robust parameters even in the presence of endogenous variables. 
  Data frequency is quarterly and spans from first quarter 2001 to second quarter 
2009.  Furthermore,  the  spread  premium  paid  by  debentures  (SP)  is  used  as  the 
dependent variable based on two specifications: (i) with accounting information and (ii) 
with ratings of the debentures and accounting information. 
  Before  the  estimation  of  the  dynamic  panel  data,  the  GMM  panel  data 
parameters  were  estimated  with  a  static  model.  Furthermore,  the  results  of  the 
estimations  for  two  specifications  are  considered  (see  table  6).
19  The  results  of  the 
Sargan  test  and  serial  autocorrelation  test  of  first  (m1)  and  second  order  (m2)  are 
satisfactory for both specifications. 
Both  results  in  specification  1  (which  considers  accounting  information)  and 
specification 2 (which includes the ratings of the debentures), show that all coefficients 
have  statistical  significance  and  the  sign  of  the  coefficients  are  consonant  with  the 
theoretical argument. As a consequence, this result indicates the presence of market 
discipline in Brazil.  
For application of the Arellano and Bond (1991) methodology (dynamic GMM), 
the variable SP with 1 lag was considered in the estimations (see table 6). The Sargan 
test for both specifications indicates that the instruments as a group are exogenous. In 
addition, the tests of first-order (m1) and second-order (m2) serial correlation do not 
denote  autocorrelation  problem.  Besides,  all  coefficients,  in  both  specifications,  are 
statistically significant and are in agreement with the theoretical perspective. In short, 
the  result  confirms  the  one  presented  in  the  static  GMM,  that  is,  both  account 
information  and  ratings  are  relevant  in  the  explanation  of  spread  premium  paid  by 
debentures and thus indicate the presence of market discipline in the Brazilian banking 
industry.  
                                                 
19 Dummy variable is introduced in both estimations (static and dynamic) for avoiding the effect caused 
by the presence of outliers (see box plot in appendix – figure A.2). 21 
Table 6 
Debenture spread - static and dynamic panel data (GMM)  
  Static GMM    Dynamic GMM 
Regressors  Specification 1    Specification 2    Specification 1    Specification 2 
  Coef.  Std. Error    Coef.  Std. Error    Coef.  Std. Error    Coef.  Std. Error 
SPt-1               0.1651***  0.0001     0.0686***  0.0007 
Rt-1        -0.0198***  0.0001          -0.0195***  0.0001 
BIt  -0.0041***  0.0000    -0.0011***  0.0001    -0.0040***  0.0000    -0.0009***  0.0000 
LDt-1   0.2344***  0.0001      0.3447***  0.0105     0.4000***  0.0020     0.4235***  0.0080 
IIt-1   0.0007***  0.0000     0.0012***  0.0000     0.0004***  0.0000     0.0012***  0.0000 
NPIt-1   1.4195***  0.0004     0.8369***  0.0056     1.5420***  0.0019     0.8772***  0.0093 
dummy  -0.0811***  0.0000    -0.0675***  0.0000    -0.0918***  0.0000    -0.0724***  0.0001 
N. instrum.  11    16    11    16 
Obs.  338    304    338    304 
Sargan test   29.676    24.0404    28.2475    25.5349 
(p-value)  (0.482)    (0.4593)    (0.3983)    (0.3772) 
m1  -2.243    -2.0060    -3.3127    -2.4215 
(p-value)  0.026    0.0461    0.0011    0.0163 
m2  -1.319    -1.0941    -0.7772    -0.8666 
(p-value)  (0.189)    (0.2752)    (0.4379)    (0.3872) 
Note: Asterisks (***) denote significance at the 1%. 22 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In regard to financial regulation, as a manner of preventing the occurrence of new 
crisis, supervising agencies maintain the strategy of reacting to causes of crisis after the fact. 
The subprime crisis (2008) revealed that the model, which was valid in Greenspan’s time at 
the Fed, based on trust, on market regulation, and on the discernment of the managers of 
credit  portfolios  of  the  financial  institutions  was  not  approved  in  the  market  test.  The 
“invisible hand”, alone, is incapable of eliminating every imbalance. The financial market, 
especially in the USA and Europe, paid a high price due to the presence of an agile system, 
less regulation, and, at first, a more efficient system which became more exposed to risks and 
financial shocks. The regulators neglected their main function and excessively loosened the 
rules in the financial market. 
Although the argumentation above represents the core of the idea of the group which 
are  nihilists  regarding  the  market  forces,  there  exists  a  growing  literature  which  shows 
evidence  that  the  transparency  concerning  disclosure  of  information  to  the  private  agents 
represents  an  important  mechanism  for  monitoring  financial  institutions.  Furthermore, 
assuming that transparency is capable of eliminating asymmetric information of the economic 
agents, a connection with the first welfare theorem is possible. Hence, an increase in the 
transparency would increase the welfare because it would cause a decrease in the forecasts 
errors and in the expected volatility of the variables subject to uncertainty. Therefore, the third 
pillar of the Basel II, which stimulates the market discipline by the disclosure of information, 
provides the market agents with conditions for themselves to develop mechanisms regarding 
risk.  
  The empirical evidence in this study puts light on the relevance of the regulation of the 
financial system  and of the transparency of information  by  the banking sector. Countries 
which  have  a  higher  index  of  transparency  and  in  which  the  financial  system  was  more 
regulated, suffered fewer negative effects caused by the subprime crisis. The findings denote 
that  a  greater  commitment  by  the  supervision  agencies  implied  less  vulnerability  of  the 
financial market. 
  In particular, for the Brazilian case, it is observed that, contrary to the case of the 
countries at the time of the subprime crisis, Brazil was a country with over-regulation in the 
financial  market  and  the  banking  sector  worked  under  leverage.  Moreover,  the  country 
presented a comfortable situation with international reserves, high compulsory reserves, and 23 
high interest rates which offered an adequate condition for the monetary authority to respond 
to the tightening credit supply after the crisis. It is important to note that an important factor 
that cannot be neglected for the apparent success in going around the subprime crisis, which is 
confirmed by the empirical evidence, is the presence of market discipline in Brazil. 
  Although Brazil has been successful with the strategies adopted at the critical phase in 
the subprime crisis, there exist several points that demand reflection in regard to regulation 
and supervision agencies. As highlighted by Basel II, a good supervision may consider a 
regulation system as not the only instrument of supervision. Hence, market discipline is an 
important part of the regulatory system with the main objective to punish the bad management 
risk in the financial institutions. In brief, regulation and transparency of the Brazilian financial 
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